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Abstract 
 Historically, countries often faced the difficult task of favoring one immigrant group over 
another. Typically, this is in response to their inability to support those immigrants due to an 
unstable economy. However, some scholars argue that during times of economic prosperity, 
excluding immigrants may be the result of the group’s incapacity to assimilate to the nation’s 
“cultural identity”. Since Chile’s conception as a nation and as one of the most prosperous Latin 
American countries, they have received notably minuscule immigration rates. As a result, 
Chileans prides themselves as a relatively homogeneous country. Consequently, in 2018, 
President Sebastián Piñera differentiated visas between Venezuelan and Haitian immigrants. The 
Venezuelan visa merely reiterated the general immigration requirements, while the Haitian visa 
significantly restricted their immigration visa. Because Haitian immigrants make up 6th largest 
immigrant population in Chile and maintained a low economic dependence upon the economy, 
this case study sought to determine whether an economic approach or “cultural identity” theory 
resulted in stricter immigration policies. Using a mixed research design of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, the findings revealed that Chileans opinions increased negatively with the 
influx of immigrants, that did not coincide with the perception of their economic security. 
Therefore, I assess that the “cultural identity” theory is more consistent with creating stricter visa 
requirements for Haitian immigrants.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the Spring of 2019, upon arriving in Valparaíso, Chile, the community was still 
discussing the fatal incident of the Haitian immigrant, Joane Florvil. Her story became known as 
one of the most infamous incidents of immigrant injustice in Chile. In 2017, Joane’s life changed 
when she and her daughter went to the police station to report how her husband became a victim 
of job exploitation. Shortly after her arrival, Joane realized the police offered no translator, and 
she decided to locate one to assist her. In Haiti, it is customary to leave a child with an 
authoritative figure. This explains Joane’s lack of hesitation in leaving her daughter at the police 
station. Within fifteen minutes, the police misinterpreted Joane’s departure as an act of child 
abandonment. Consequently, the police arrested Joane, where she remained in custody for four 
weeks. The official police report stated that Joane’s feelings of hopelessness caused her to have a 
psychotic break. As a result, Joane repeatedly hit her head on the wall, causing her death. 
Unofficially, numerous irregularities in police reports caused public suspicion and outrage 
towards Joane’s death and, overall, her denial of rights (See Appendix 3C) (Vargas Rojas 2017). 
After learning of this instance, I realized the discriminatory attitudes Chileans expressed towards 
Haitian immigrants.  
Throughout my semester in Chile, I observed numerous forms of economic and social 
inequality against Haitian immigrants. I heard Chileans refer to Haitian street workers as 
“negritos”. While the suffix “ito” is primarily used as a term of endearment in Chile, in this case, 
it was used as a racial slur. More subtle acts of intolerance included derogatory caricatures drawn 
on public buildings, which negatively depicted the prominent physical characteristics of Haitian 
immigrants. Furthermore, these crude depictions were accompanied by comments such as “NOT 
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WELCOME” (See Appendix 3b). As a result, I dedicated my research to Chilean immigration 
and discovered that, in 2018, President Sebastián Piñera changed immigration laws to specify 
distinctive visas for Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants (República de Chile 2018a).  
Until 2018, all immigrants retained the same visa regulations and underwent the same 
application process. However, the new visas target two immigrant groups: Haitians and 
Venezuelans. Venezuelans and Haitians are not the largest immigrant population in Chile. 
Peruvians constitute 25.2% of the immigrant population, while Colombians make up 14.1%. 
Venezuelans rank the 3rd largest immigrant group with 11.1%; while, Haitians, who received 
stricter visas, only rank as the 6th largest immigrant population with 8.4%. Numerically, 
Venezuelans surpass Haitians; however, despite being a much smaller demographic, these 
immigrants faced stringent legal barriers that required more money, resources, and efforts to 
obtain a visa. By contrast, the new Venezuelan immigrants’ visas reflected the standard visa that 
any foreigner applied for to gain entrance into Chile. The disparity in visas raises the question as 
to why Chile excludes an immigrant group that makes up a minuscule proportion of the Chilean 
population in comparison to other immigrants in the country (INE 2017). Analyzing quantitative 
data suggests that Peruvians, Columbians, Venezuelans, and other large demographic groups 
utilize the majority of Chile’s resources when it comes to immigration. However, Haitians have 
been targeted through stricter immigration policies. 
Before changing the visas, Chile maintained a relatively prosperous economy and an 
average unemployment rate of 6.96% (INE 2017). With this in mind, Chile need not worry over 
Haitian immigrants’ insignificant economic impact as one of the smaller immigrant groups. In 
fact, it appears that with Haitians making up less than 1% of the entire immigrant population, 
Chileans concerned over the potential economic ramifications of hosting them is not justified. 
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Globally, nations excluding immigrants is not an uncommon practice. However, President 
Piñera’s discernment between immigrants from various nations, who are economically equal, 
makes Chile an outlier case. This case study utilizes a mixed research design to test whether an 
economic or cultural identity threat influenced Chilean immigration laws. Consequently, this 
leads to the overall question of this case study: What drove the recent immigration policy in 
Chile? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This thesis focuses on two potential justifications for changing immigration visas in 
Chile. First, the economic approach interprets immigration policy changes because of class-
based attempts to defend their job security. Whereas, the “cultural identity” theory suggests that 
an immigrant’s threat to the host country’s concept of self and identity generates stricter 
immigration policies (Meyers 2000). These two theories examine what drives immigration policy 
and are used to determine if the new Chilean visas align with economic challenges or cultural 
differences.  
Most case studies analyzing migration in Western democratic countries found that stricter 
immigration policies created during times of economic prosperity were a result of a threat to 
“cultural identity”. When these countries speculate that a large influx of immigrants threatens 
their economic stability, stricter laws are created. Additionally, national identity factors into the 
creation and/or amendment of immigration laws. More than likely, the host country accepts 
immigrant groups who more similarly reflect their national identity; therefore, excluding 
immigrants facing adversity in cultural assimilation. I argue that Chile’s actions resemble that of 
the Western nations’ due to the minuscule Haitian population and a relatively stable economy. 
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Moreover, there are several more prominent immigration groups present in Chile, yet the 
government placed more severe conditions on the smaller immigrant group, who poses less 
economic dependence.    
 
Case Selection 
Due to its geographic location along the southwest coast of the Pacific Ocean and its 
border along the Andes mountains, Chile has long remained a comparably isolated country. This 
makes Chile an exception to other Latin American countries who experienced significant 
immigration during and after their colonization. Other than receiving immigrants during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, immigration to Chile has been relatively low during most of the 
20th century (Eyheramendy et al. 2015). As a result, this has affected Chile’s unique stances on 
meticulously selecting between “desirable” and “undesirable” immigrants. Since the 1990s, 
Chile’s stable economy has transformed the nation into a haven for immigrants (Cano and Soffia 
2009). Chile’s record as a “non-immigrant” receiving country during previous centuries allowed 
Chileans to pride themselves on their homogeneity (Echevarría et al. 2018, Walsh 2019). To 
elaborate, a recent study indicated that Chileans identify themselves as “primarily white 
mestizos” (Echevarría 2018). While the global perspective on “whiteness” varies significantly 
from this viewpoint, Chileans have used their identity as a catalyst for racial intolerance against 
immigrants that do not physically resemble the average Chilean or face obstacles in conforming 
to its national identity.   
In recent decades, Chile experienced a significant spike in its immigrant population. 
From 1980 to 2017, Chile’s immigrant population increased by over 500% (Batavola 2017). 
Despite this dramatic increase, worldwide, Chile ranks 71st with a 4.4% immigrant population, 
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whereas the United States ranks 1st with an immigrant population of 14.4% (Batavola 2017, INE 
2017). Therefore, Chile’s immigrant population of less than 5% is considered low in comparison 
to other major immigrant-receiving countries. As a nation who primarily selects immigrants that 
more closely reflect Chilean culture or further bolsters their homogeneous identity, they felt 
threatened by such a significant increase in regional immigration. This case study is prominent 
because it looks at how an economically prosperous nation, unaccustomed to immigration, 
decides which immigrants to accept and why.   
 
Hypothesis 
I hypothesize that Chilean immigration laws changed due to a “cultural identity” threat. 
The discriminatory visa design only enforces Chilean’s perceived homogeneous identity. 
Scholars argue that identity, as a socially constructed concept, can restrict people from social, 
political, and economic inclusion. While in Chile, I observed that Chileans often associate their 
identity with the color of their skin when discussing immigration. Quite often, I heard Chileans 
describe Venezuelan immigrants using positive descriptions while referring to Haitians as the 
“others” who did not belong. To me, it appeared that Haitian immigrants posed less of a threat to 
Chile’s economy, and more a threat to Chilean “cultural identity”. I began to consider what made 
Haitians less desirable than Venezuelans according to society? I believe that this case study will 
reveal that the “cultural identity” threat correlated with changing immigration visas because it is 
improbable that during a period of economic prosperity, Chileans felt their job security 
threatened. However, knowing that Haitian immigrants make up less than 1% of the immigrant 
population and maintain the most diverse culture of all immigrants, Chileans likely felt their 
“cultural identity” threatened.  
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Data and Methods 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Did a threat to the economy or cultural identity 
drive recent immigration policy in Chile? To answer the question, this study adopts a mixed 
research design that uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I analyze whether Chile’s 
adoption of stricter immigration laws coincides with the years that experienced more economic 
stagnation. Because most of the data derives from Chilean-centered databases and are in Spanish, 
all translations come from the author unless otherwise stated. Quantitative analysis includes the 
makeup of the immigrant population, types of visas granted, immigrant economic dependence, 
and opinions of the economy. Qualitative data analyzes the language used in the new visas and 
humanitarian flights. These variables derive from public opinion surveys and censuses to provide 
a basis to test the hypothesis that visa differentiation occurred in response to a cultural threat, 
rather than an economic threat.     
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Chapter 2: Different Paths to Immigration Policy 
 
This study focuses on two explanations for how nations treat immigrants. One possibility 
is that they are perceived as an economic threat. Another possibility is that immigrants are a 
threat to cultural identity. This case study seeks to discover whether Chile’s rejection of Haitian 
immigrants is consistent with an economic or cultural identity threat. In this thesis, I will be 
testing the theories of the economic approach and the “cultural identity” theory. The economic 
approach describes immigration policies as an economically driven and class-based political 
process based on capitalism. Whereas, the “cultural identity” theory reveals that historical 
experiences, cultural idioms, and social conflicts explain the formation of immigration policies 
(Meyers 2000).  
The economic approach mentions the term “most favored nation”, which explains that 
immigrant-receiving countries prefer higher-skilled immigrants who primarily come from these 
select countries (North 2014). Within the “cultural identity” theory, concepts discussed include 
heterogeneity, homogeneity, mestizaje, “otherness”, in-groups, and out-groups. Homogeneous 
populations are characterized according to ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics, whereas 
heterogeneous states exhibit more diverse identities in those aspects (Money 1999). Furthermore, 
the ideology of mestizaje, the result of mixing indigenous races with Spaniard colonizers, 
homogenized Latin American populations (Bailey and Telles 2013). As a result, the current 
Chilean-born inhabitants consider immigrants that appear physically different as “others”, which 
is more likely to place them into out-groups in society (Berg 2015) and can cause discriminatory 
sentiment (Doña Reveco and Mullan 2014). I analyze how Chile’s lack of immigration, then a 
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sudden influx of immigrants, could have resulted in one of these theories influencing stricter 
immigration policies.  
 
Economic Approach 
The economic approach theorizes that the creation of strict immigration policies is a 
result of the lower working class competing with immigrants for jobs. As a result, the current 
workers feel their economic security threatened (Meyers 2000, Sirlopú and Van Oudenhoven 
2013). In a study of the Western European immigration experience, the scholar concluded that 
members of the labor force felt endangered by the potential of losing their jobs and being forced 
into new positions that may require costly training. Testing this theoretical argument in this case 
study can show whether it applies outside of the European context. Scholars further argue that in 
a capitalistic society, immigrants are more likely to receive jobs because they are young, easily 
replaced, endure the most undesirable working conditions, and, overall, receive less pay. Thus, 
the current labor force is more likely to oppose immigration because they suspect immigrants of 
robbing them of their jobs (Castells 1975, Nikolinakos 1975). In the case of Chile, Venezuelans 
and Haitians are typically segregated in their employment opportunities. For example, 
Venezuelans often work in customer service positions, such as waiters and dishwashers, while 
Haitians work more informally in the streets selling common goods to locals.   
 Scholars explains that this economic approach results in immigration policies that favor 
immigrants from preferred countries, often mentioning the term “most favored nation”. This term 
places immigrants into two categories: higher-skilled immigrants contributing to the economy, 
and lower-skilled immigrants who require government assistance. Consequently, the “most 
favored nations” often receive larger immigrant quotas (North 2014, Stefoni 2011). Specifically, 
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during the 1920s and 1960s, immigrant-receiving countries provided nations in northern and 
western Europe larger immigrant quotas because they were considered highly skilled. Pursuing 
this economic approach, in the 20th century, the United States gave large immigrant quotas to 
Great Britain in an effort to increase the number of highly skilled workers (North 2014).  
Despite today’s elimination of immigrant quotas, other immigration laws numerically 
limit the number of “unwanted” immigrants (North 2014). Therefore, it is more likely that 
immigrants fleeing crises, who have not had the opportunity or ability to obtain experience in 
highly skilled professions, are less likely to be considered immigrants from the “most favored 
nations”. According to Castells, during periods of economic recession, the working class 
typically fears job loss in competition with immigrant workers (Castells 1975). Theoretically, if 
the economy is thriving, the working class is less likely to worry about job insecurity. However, 
Chile, who experienced significant economic growth in the 1990s, reacted negatively to influxes 
of immigrants from nations experiencing crises.  
Likewise, there are further contradictions to this economic approach. For example, the 
theory fails to expound upon the potential effects of diverse ethnic origins on the host country’s 
society (Meyers 2000). Presently, Chile is experiencing an influx of culturally diverse 
immigrants from Haiti, which makes it challenging to prove that the economic approach 
validates changing visa laws and procedures. The theory also fails to consider the political, 
societal, and demographic factors within the current economic situation that might influence 
immigration laws (Nikolinakos 1975). Similarly, there is a negative relationship between 
immigration and unemployment rates, linking periods of economic prosperity to decreased 
unemployment rates (Money 1999). Nevertheless, this factor contradicts the economic approach 
in Chile’s case because it is considered one of the most prosperous countries in Latin America.  
Geist 10 
 
Furthermore, the economic approach often requires that the leader of the country changes 
immigration policies due to significant pressure from the working-class population (Money 
1999). Yet, survey data from 2018 to 2019 reveals that household income did not correlate with 
President Piñera’s approval ratings (LAPOP 2019). This signifies that socioeconomic status did 
not determine a person’s endorsement of President Piñera nor his policies. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that workers of low socioeconomic status, who would have felt their job security 
threatened, influenced Piñera’s decision to change immigration policies.  
 
“Cultural Identity” Theory 
The other approach in this case study is the “cultural identity” approach, which analyzes 
how a country’s history, ethnicity, cultural heritage, and identity shape immigration policies. A 
nation’s “cultural identity” is a contested, fluid social boundary that becomes significant when 
the current inhabitants feel threatened by potential immigration (Meyers 2000). One of the most 
critical factors in defining a country’s level of immigrant tolerance is how it regards its own 
national identity. When speaking about immigration, countries often say what they are not rather 
than what they are. Such is the case of Haitian immigrants in Chile who more likely state that 
Chilean values are not similar to Haitians. As a result, nations perceive immigrants who do not 
conform to their identity as “dirty, uncivilized, and less than fully human”. Evidence of this is 
found in the 1920s when the United States excluded Asian immigrants strictly for their ethnic 
and cultural differences (Meilaender 2001, Money 1999). At first glance, it appears this may 
explain Chile’s changed policies that exclude Haitians, the immigrant group who least represents 
Chilean cultural identity.  
Geist 11 
 
When discussing the “cultural identity” theory, it is crucial to determine what aspect of 
identity the host population believes unifies them. Scholars argue that typical non-immigrant-
receiving nations base their “cultural identity” on a relatively common culture or ethnicity 
(Meyers 2000). A nation’s previous insularity to immigration often creates a lower threshold of 
tolerance than a heterogeneous nation. This is evident in Chile’s case, which, as a non-
immigrant-receiving country, produced a perceived ethnically and culturally dominant 
population. On the other hand, nations built upon immigration produce racially disparate 
populations and are more likely to accept immigrants (Meyers 2000, Money 1999). In the 
European context, immigrant acceptance correlated with a shared racial identity; therefore, 
anyone who did not conform to that identity posed a threat to national unity (Meissner 1992). 
The perceived homogeneity of a population often delineates whether the current 
population feels threatened by diverse immigrants (Money 1999). Moreover, scholars warn of 
the potential adverse effects on a society that is “not used to social heterogeneity” (Doña Reveco 
and Mullan 2014). Chile experienced these adverse effects following the arrival of Haitian 
immigrants, which resulted in discriminatory actions, such as the extreme case of Joane Florvil. 
Many activists theorize that this violation of rights could have been avoided if the government 
had provided an adequate translator. However, because Joane did not conform to Chile’s 
“cultural identity”, she was not treated like a regular citizen, nor a priority. Additionally, 
negative sentiments that arose in Chile include inequality in the education system, violence 
against children and adults, and discrimination in the workforce.  
To continue the concept of homogeneity, mestizaje, the mixing of races through 
marriage, occurred in Latin American countries in response to various political, economic, and 
cultural forces. Consequently, this informal social construct integrated races, weakened racial 
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distinctions, and emphasized whiteness. The ideology of mestizaje caused some Latin American 
countries, such as Argentina and Chile, to appear more homogeneous. However, countries with 
predominantly Afro-descendant or indigenous populations, such as Brazil and Bolivia, developed 
a more heterogeneous society. Recently, both Brazil and Bolivia implemented racial reforms to 
confront their evident stratification (Bailey and Telles 2013, Green, Skidmore, and Smith 2014). 
However, other Latin American countries recently experiencing a change in their homogeneous 
society are less willing to create laws to diminish racial inequality (Money 1999). Consistently, 
Latin American migrants make up similar groups in search of work (Lawrence 2015); hence, the 
influx of Haitian immigrants, who uphold a more diverse culture and ethnicity, threatened 
Chilean identity.  
Moreover, people’s identities categorize them into in-groups or out-groups. The out-
group generally faces discrimination and exclusion from society since it is easier to categorize 
them as different (Berg 2015, Doña Reveco and Mullan 2014). Great Britain illustrates this in 
using the common terminology “immigrants” to refer to any “colored people” regardless of 
whether they are immigrants (Bovenkerk, Miles, and Verbunt 1991). In the case of Great Britain, 
society automatically associates dissimilar people as immigrants. This example shows that it is 
common for typically “whiter” nations to use racialization to set apart citizens from immigrants. 
Comparably, a study scrutinizing Chilean media’s use of terminology revealed a discrepancy in 
describing immigrants. While Venezuelans were referred to as “political victims”, Haitians were 
described as “others” (Valenzuela-Vergara 2018). Thus, the media cast Haitian immigrants in a 
negative light instead of regarding them as an immigrant group also in need of aid.  
Additionally, it is common for citizens to coin immigrants as “others” when they possess 
an identity that does not conform to the host nation. In the host country, an uneven geographic 
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distribution makes immigrants more distinguishable because they primarily settle in areas of 
opportunity (Money 1999). This leads the citizens to develop sentiments such as the “others” 
possessing an identity that is “unnatural, barbaric, and uncivilized” (Meilaender 2001). Placing 
these “others” into a derogative category often leads to the idea that immigrants threaten the 
common good of society (Doña Reveco and Mullan 2014). Likewise, the social media study also 
revealed that Haitian immigrants are referred to as “delinquents, deviant, and dangerous” 
(Valenzuela-Vergara 2018). This example shows how the term “others” leads to the 
criminalization of immigrants, despite Chile’s crime rates not increasing with an influx in 
immigration.  
At the same time, further debates disprove the “cultural identity” theory because it 
downplays the importance of external and situational factors that may have influenced the 
creation of stricter immigration laws. For instance, immigration places political pressure on the 
local level, which rarely amounts to political change. Unless the topic of immigration is relevant 
to maintaining an upcoming electoral majority, politicians are more likely to ignore these 
political pressures. Yet again, the Chilean case is an exception to this counter argument because 
immigration was a crucial topic in Piñera’s upcoming election in 2018. Also, the “cultural 
identity” theory disregards the effects of current economic trends on the creation of a country’s 
immigration policies (Meyers 2000, Money 1999). To reiterate, immigration and unemployment 
are contributing factors to a country’s perceived economic stability. Chile’s case rebuttals this 
argument by maintaining a prosperous economy and low unemployment rates. Universally, it 
remains challenging to definitively correlate stricter immigration policies with a threat to 
“cultural identity” due to contributing political, economic, and societal factors.  
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Political Factor Consideration  
 Seeing that both theories fail to consider the political factors that could have influenced 
Piñera’s decision to change the visas, this portion of the thesis discusses the potential political 
effects. It is important to note that the visa, created by a conservative Chilean president, appears 
to show preference towards Venezuelan immigrants who are fleeing an authoritarian, socialist 
government. It is possible that President Piñera, in an effort to punish the spread of socialism 
consuming Venezuela, sympathized with Venezuelan immigrants. Many democratic nations 
sought to reprove the “Pink Tide”, which are countries who veered away from democracy 
towards socialism. To increase ambiguity for the new immigration policies, Piñera created two 
new visas for Venezuelans and Haitians. However, rather than showing preference towards 
Venezuelan immigrants, the new visa merely reflects the standard visa that other immigrants 
obtain. Furthermore, I also argue that appealing to public approval likely influenced Piñera’s 
decision instead of showing sympathy to immigrants fleeing socialism.  
During the presidential campaign in 2018, the public and candidates heavily contested 
immigration reforms. The candidate Alejandro Guillier proposed strict immigration reforms, 
similar to Piñera’s former immigration proposals. Whereas the other candidate, Beatriz Sánchez, 
supported immigration to Chile. During his first term, Piñera failed to change immigration 
reforms, so he promised his anti-immigration supporters that, if elected, he would either propose 
a new reform or attempt to renew his failed policy. The elections required a runoff between 
Piñera and Guillier, which placed the candidates with the most restricting stances on immigration 
against each other. Subsequently, Piñera further hardened his stance on immigration, winning 
over public sentiment and the presidential election (Concha-Villanueva 2018, Doña Reveco 
2018). Since Chilean public opinion is infamous for creating nationwide protests, I deduce that 
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Piñera followed through on his plans to create a new immigration reform to please the public 
demand for a solution.  
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Chapter 3: Historical Perspective of Chilean Immigration 
 
 Understanding Chile’s history of immigration is imperative when analyzing why 
President Piñera changed immigration laws. Historically, scholars studied Latin American 
countries as migrant-sending nations rather than migrant-receiving nations. Yet, due to conflicts, 
economic failure, and authoritarian governments, intraregional immigration now characterizes 
many Latin American countries. Due to Chile’s geographic location, immigration patterns 
emerged that vary greatly in comparison to other Latin American countries. As a result, Chileans 
developed a homogeneous identity that influenced their perception of immigrants (Eyheramendy 
et al. 2015). Specifically, Chileans are more selective than other Latin American countries 
regarding immigration. Today, the increase in racially diverse immigration challenges Chilean’s 
insular attitudes. Considering Chile’s unique historical influxes of immigration provides a 
foundation to understand whom Chile constitutes as a “desirable” immigrant. 
 
Colonization and the Indigenous Population  
During the Spanish colonization of the Americas, Chile remained an outlier. Central 
American and Andean countries, excluding Chile, experienced more severe forms of 
colonization. Spain considered these countries valuable due to its accessibility, possession of 
precious metals, fertile terrain, or other valuable resources. By contrast, Spain neglected the 
peripheral colony of Chile, due to its perceived lack of resources, remote location, and diverse 
geography. However, upon realizing Chile’s potential for agricultural production, Spain 
established a more prominent role in the country. Nonetheless, Spain’s investment in Chile paled 
in comparison to other Latin American colonies.  
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Accordingly, colonization affected Latin America’s indigenous populations in various 
ways due to unique geographic features. Primarily the dispersal of indigenous populations and 
the Spanish incremental integration in Central America, Venezuela, and Colombia, allowed 
retainment of racial diversity. Although European disease unknowingly killed millions of 
indigenous people throughout Latin America, comparatively, Chile’s concentrated indigenous 
population was nearly eradicated. To bolster the existing labor force, the Spanish frequently 
brought African slaves to its colonies, which often resulted in a highly polarized, biracial state. 
However, because Chile was a non-essential asset to Spain, the Afro-slave population was 
minimal (Green, Skidmore, Smith 2014).  
Chile, like other Spanish colonies, experienced the informal process of mestizaje. The 
various political, economic, and cultural factors gradually led many Latin American countries to 
have interracial marriages. Mestizaje led to a caste system that associated “white” physical traits 
with positions of power and dignity. Therefore, without knowing, Chileans supported the 
assertion that specific racial characteristics result in more social dominance. However, since 
Spain eradicated most of Chile’s indigenous population and did not bring an abundant African 
slave population to the territory, mestizaje allowed Chile to create a relatively homogeneous 
mestizo population (Green, Skidmore, Smith 2014). This form of “blanquedad,” also known as 
whitening, generated stereotypes that would affect how Chileans viewed immigration in their 
post-colonial period. 
 
Desirable Versus Undesirable Immigrants 
 In the 19th century, Latin American independence from Spanish rule allowed nations to 
choose whether to accept immigrants or not. As is the case with many former colonies that 
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experienced violent independence wars, Mexico resented its colonizers and banned the Spanish. 
Consequently, Mexico did not acquire a European-born working class. On the other hand, many 
countries wanted to attract immigrants to enhance their industries. For example, Argentina 
utilized southern European immigrants to strengthen its labor force, thus increasing the 
population by 60% (Green, Skidmore, Smith 2014). Similarly, Chile broadened its Spanish, 
English, German, and Italian immigrant population. Chilean literature reveals that European 
immigrants contributed to “economic, cultural, and social” aspects of the nation (Cano, Pizarro, 
and Soffia 2009). Throughout the 19th century, the government implemented reforms to promote 
the “Colonization Law” (Ley de colonización), which incentivized European immigrants with 
machinery and uncultivated land. The “General Colonization Agency in Europe” (Agencia 
General de Colonización en Europa) placed Chilean offices in European countries to encourage 
immigration to Chile (Aninat and Vergara 2019). A famous Chilean historian described that the 
“idea was not only to bring more people to an almost uninhabited country, but to bring better 
people” (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009).  
 Nevertheless, during the 1800s, Chile did not consider all immigrants as “desirable”. 
Chile’s former racial hierarchy developed negative sentiments toward immigrants who did not 
contribute significantly to their society. To illustrate, after the Pacific War in 1879, Chile gained 
vast, valuable land that led to the discovery of copper nitrate (salpetre) (Eyheramendy et al. 
2015). To Chile’s benefit, this increased European investors and provided labor for the 
workforce. To their detriment, expanding their geographical boundaries meant that Chile now 
faced regional immigration. The 1885 census revealed that 67% of immigrants in Chile were 
Bolivian, Peruvian, and Argentinian (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009, Green, Skidmore, and 
Smith 2014). Furthermore, Chile’s newly discovered copper mines tempted many Asian 
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immigrants, specifically the Chinese, to work in Chile. However, the number of Asian 
immigrants in Chile was minute to those working in Peru and Cuba (Aninat and Vergara 2019).  
 Expanding their selective immigration process in the early 20th century, Chile developed 
its concept of a “desirable” immigrant, which were those who arrived through the “Colonization 
Program” (Stefoni 2011). Although the program resulted in European immigration, Argentina 
received ten times more European immigrants than Chile (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009). 
This proves that on a regional scale, “desirable” immigration to Chile was not quite significant. 
Again, their new policies appeared to be progressive, yet, in reality, allowed for little growth.  
Similarly, the arrival of Arab immigrants fleeing the fallen Ottoman Empire led to the 
Chilean government’s further restriction of immigration laws. The “Residence of Undesirable 
Elements Law” (Ley de residencia de elementos indeseables), facilitated the deportation of 
“harmful” and “undesirable” immigrants (República de Chile 1918). In the same manner, at the 
end of WWII, Chile created a reform that would turn away immigrants who did not bring 
“cultural capital” to the state. Additionally, in 1953, a law was passed that “Will help to perfect 
the biological conditions of the race…the incorporation of easily assimilated elements, 
preventing the entry of undesirable or unadaptable individuals” (contribuirá a perfeccionar las 
condiciones biológicas de la raza… la incorporación de elementos fácilmente asimilables, 
evitando el ingreso de individuos indeseables o inadaptables) (Aninat and Vergara 2019 and 
Stefoni 2011). During the first half of the 20th century, Chileans established laws that both 
promoted “desirable” immigrants who easily assimilated to their culture and benefitted their 
homogeneous identity and excluded “undesirable” immigrants who harmed Chilean’s unified 
identity.   
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Sending Political Refugees 
Although the number of immigrants during the 19th and 20th centuries was relatively 
insignificant in comparison to the actual Chilean population, immigration nearly ceased during 
the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. This was due to the dictator exemplifying the nationalistic 
views expressed during the mid-20th century. Evidence of this is demonstrated in the 
implementation of the “Foreigner’s Law” (Ley de Extranjería) (República de Chile 1975), which 
reinforced the idea that foreigners threatened the unity of the nation and its Spanish ancestry 
(Sirlopú and Van Oudenhoven 2013, Stefoni 2011). From 1973 until the late 80s, Chile’s 
economic and political crisis disincentivized immigration. In fact, in 1982, Chile had the lowest 
immigrant population in Latin America (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009). A few years later, 
Pinochet further changed the immigration law with the “Decreto Supremo No. 597” to restrict 
immigrants who were considered “undesirable” from immigration to Chile (República de Chile 
1984). As a result, a portion of the current Chilean population became accustomed to restricting 
immigrants, which likely affected their outlook on immigration today.  
In effect, while immigration decreased, emigration increased as Chileans fled the 
Pinochet regime, causing a -36.7% drop in residency. Estimates place nearly 200,000 Chileans 
leaving the country between 1973 and 1986. Most exiles faced obstacles with integrating into a 
new occupation, language, and country. In contradiction to the exiling of citizens, two weeks 
before the scheduled 1988 plebiscite, Pinochet announced that all remaining exiles were free to 
return home. With the election of Patricio Aylwin in 1989, most exiled Chileans returned home 
(Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009). The regime exiling citizens provided a framework to 
understand what it feels like to establish a home in a new country. In theory, this uncertainty 
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should have changed Chilean outlook to be more accepting of immigrants. In practice, with the 
return of democracy, Chilean identity continued to impact exclusionary immigration policies.  
 
From Dictatorship to Democracy 
During the transition to democracy in the 1990s, Chile experienced economic prosperity, 
political stability, and low unemployment rates (Cano and Soffia 2009, Sirlopú and Van 
Oudenhoven 2013). This was not the case for the economies of many surrounding countries 
whose deteriorating conditions caused mass immigration. Specifically, Chile received 
immigrants from Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia (Doña Reveco 2018). During this period, Chile 
transitioned from a migrant-sending country to a high-income, migrant-receiving country (Doña 
Reveco and Mullan 2014). As a result, former President Eduardo Frei developed a legislation 
program in 1995, which provided temporary visas to immigrants. Consequentially, 16,764 
Peruvians and 2,116 Bolivians received temporary legal residency in Chile. Peruvians and 
Colombians reported that they faced discrimination in Chile, yet throughout time, this abated due 
to their similar cultures and ethnicities. To expound, immigrant groups found that once they built 
relationships with Chilean nationals and assimilated into the culture, the discrimination 
dissipated (Caqueo-Urízar et al. 2017). Despite the resolution between Chileans and these 
immigrants, ultimately, there was no path toward permanent residency. Despite their illegal 
status, immigrants stayed after their visas expired. This presented a conflict because Pinochet’s 
1975 law, also known as the “policy of no policy”, remains intact, allowing immigrants to 
overstay their permits (Doña Reveco 2018). As a result, the Chilean population felt they lacked 
effective immigration policies.  
 
Geist 22 
 
Presidential Immigration Reforms  
 Further problems arose as immigration escalated, calling for amendments to Pinochet’s 
immigration law. Over the past 30 years, immigration in Chile increased from an average of 
0.8% to 4.4%.  (INE 2017). Despite Chile ranking 71st globally in terms of immigration, the 
dramatic spike in immigrants presented a sudden change in the dynamic of the Chilean 
population. Considering that, other countries accustomed to immigration, typically experience 
these effects gradually. Recent Chilean administrations attempted to address the problem yet 
failed to replace the 1975 immigration law. As a result, Chilean presidents consistently 
implement temporary directives, which do not require approval from congress and are easily 
changed or eliminated with a new administration (Doña Reveco 2018).  
In addition to former President Michelle Bachelet’s pro-immigration directives, she 
pushed several progressive initiatives to overturn the 1975 law but failed (República de Chile 
2014). At the opposite end of the spectrum, during President Sebastián Piñera’s first term, his 
directives focused on excluding low-skilled immigrants. Continuing with Piñera’s second and 
current term in office, his views toward immigration became the focal point of his presidency 
(Doña Reveco 2018). Before 2018, previous laws defined what a “desirable” immigrant is, yet 
the visa requirements remained the same for all immigrants. However, in 2018, Piñera imposed 
stricter regulations for Haitian visas and made the Venezuelan visa more closely reflect the visa 
requirements for all other immigrants. 
 At present, Chile is a haven for Venezuelans and Haitians fleeing the worsening political 
crises in their respective countries. While both immigrant groups are similar in their reason for 
needing a haven, Chileans only view Haitian immigrants as a dissimilar addition in ethnicity. It 
is pertinent to differentiate how the visas place Haitian immigrants at a disadvantage. The 
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disparaging language used in the visas reflects the general sentiment towards Haitian and 
Venezuelan immigrants. For example, Venezuelans have the “Temporary Visa of Democratic 
Responsibility” (Visa Temporaria de Responsabilidad Democrática) (See Appendix 1A), 
insinuating Chile’s obligation to care for a regional country. While Haitians have the “Simple 
Tourist Consular Visa” (Visa Consular de Turismo Simple) (See Appendix 1B), inadvertently 
denying their need to seek residence in a functioning country. Furthermore, the Chilean 
government classified Haitians tourist visa as “recreational, sports, health, education, business, 
family, or religious or other similar purposes” (República de Chile 2018a). In summary, this 
language refuses to acknowledge the failed state of Haiti in which the immigrants are attempting 
to leave and classifies their purpose in Chile as merely tourism.  
Comparing the visa requirements, the Venezuelan visa more closely reflects the 
requirements for the regular foreigner’s visa. The duration of the “Temporary Visa of 
Democratic Responsibility,” allows Venezuelans a “Temporary Residence” (Residencia 
Temporal) (See Appendix 2A) of one year with the option of requesting “Definitive Residence” 
(Residencia Definitiva) (See Appendix 2B). Again, the discrepancies between the two visas 
illustrate that Chile remains steadfast in its restrictive immigration stance. The Haitian “Simple 
Tourist Consular Visa” places many more sanctions, such as only permitting thirty days of 
residency. Whereas, in the past, Haitians could travel to Chile and apply for a work visa with one 
year’s residency. They are also required to prove the purchase of a round trip flight, hotel 
reservation, invitation letter, and accreditation of economic solvency (República de Chile 2018a). 
Respectively, Haitians run the risk of losing money if the government denies their visa.  
Intending to appear more progressive, Chile established the “Temporary Family 
Reunification Visas” (Visa Temporaria de Reunificación Familiar) (See Appendix 1C) for 
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Haitian immigrants. This provides a one-year visa if they can prove they have legal family 
members in Chile. Disparagingly, many restrictions and requirements present further obstacles to 
Haitian immigrants. To demonstrate, only 10,000 of these visas are granted annually and require 
family members to attend school until the age of 24 (República de Chile 2018a). This school 
obligation is not easily accomplished because, on average, Haitians possess 9.5 years of 
education (INE 2017). Despite this visa appearing to be an opportunity for further Haitian 
immigration, its limitations likely prevent a majority of them from qualifying for the visa.  
Furthering the façade, in August of 2018, President Piñera offered free, humanitarian 
flights “for the safe and orderly return of Haitian nationals to their home country” (para el 
regreso seguro y ordenado de nacionales haitianos a su país de origen) (See Appendix 3A) 
(República de Chile 2018a). Frequently, this initiative was promoted in a positive manner that 
allowed Haitians to reunite with their family members, free of charge. However, many critics 
argued that this was a form of forced deportation because, not only did it encourage Haitian 
immigrants to leave, it also required signing a nine-year contract to not return to Chile 
(República de Chile 2018a). Succinctly, the current administration of President Piñera 
implemented policies and reforms that restrict Haitian immigration while allowing Venezuelan 
immigrants access to Chile.   
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Chapter 4: Data and Analysis 
  
 Quantitative and qualitative analysis is used in this thesis to determine if the restrictive 
Haitian visa was created due to a perceived economic or “cultural identity” threat posed by 
Haitian immigrants. This section consists of data that shows the demographic makeup of 
immigrants compared to the Chilean population, visas granted to Venezuelans and Haitians, and 
immigrant economic dependence. Further analysis is composed of public opinion surveys to 
show how Chileans perceive immigration and the humanitarian flights offered to Haitian 
immigrants. Finally, the section concludes with an analysis of the public’s perception of the 
economy.  
Comparing Haitian and Venezuelan populations is essential when assessing how large 
each group is. Analyzing the number of visas granted to each group will reveal if preference 
towards Venezuelans was established prior to changing visa policies. In addition, establishing 
which group depends more on the Chilean economy shows whether there was a correlation 
between a perceived economic threat, or a real one. Because the economic approach focuses on 
the fear of losing economic security, it is important to measure how secure Chileans felt in their 
financial capabilities. Overall, analysis of the data will help test whether the economic approach 
or the “cultural identity” theory correlates with changing the visas.  
 
Venezuelan and Haitian Immigrants in Chile 
Formally, President Sebastián Piñera created new visas regulations because “it is urgent 
to reformulate and modernize to account for the current needs of the country” (se hace urgente 
reformular y modernizar para dar cuenta de las necesidades actuales del país) (República de 
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Chile 2018b). In practice, the new visas attempt to quell the flood of immigrants. If a 
government is unable to sustain an overwhelming surge of immigrants, it is justifiable to change 
immigration visas to sustain them. Therefore, I ask, is there a significant statistical difference 
between the number of Venezuelan and Haitian immigrants in Chile?  
Statistics of the number of immigrants in Chile dating from 1990 to 2017 come from 
Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas) census reports (INE 
2017). Since 1843, the INE produces official statistics and censuses and develops nearly 70 
statistical products, including demographic statistics and other vital information (INE 2017). The 
data base is an advantageous source because it provides unbiased statistics to compare previous 
and current immigration. More specifically, the INE provides data on the current ratio of Haitian 
to Venezuelan immigrants that reside in Chile.  
The data from Graph 1 shows that Venezuelan and Haitian immigration to Chile has 
increased ten-fold since the 1990s. Increased immigration correlates to the rise in economic 
prosperity that Chile experienced during its return to democracy. Before 1990 until 2009, Graph 
1 illustrates that there were significantly more Venezuelan than Haitian immigrants. However, 
between 2000-2009, both groups of immigrants increased dramatically. It also shows that in 
between 2010-2017, there were roughly 20,000 more Venezuelan immigrants than Haitian 
immigrants, meaning that Venezuelans would pose more of an economic dependence to the 
nation. The entirety of the immigrant population makes up less than 5% of the total Chilean 
population, which includes immigrants of other nationalities (INE 2017). As stated previously, 
an immigrant population of less than 5% ranks quite low on a global scale. Therefore, the 
number of Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants should not substantially affect the Chilean 
economy.  
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Graph 1 (INE 2017) 
 
Visas Granted to Venezuelans and Haitians 
 To understand the driving factors behind Chile’s visa reform, it is important to see the 
number of visas granted to Venezuelans and Haitians prior to the new policies. This section 
compares the “Temporary Visas Granted” (Temporaria Visas Ortogadas) to the “Definitive 
Permanence Visas Granted” (Permanencias Definitivas Otorgadas). The “Temporary Visa” 
allows foreigners to reside in Chile temporarily permitting seasonal work, attending a state-
recognized educational establishment, seeking refuge for humanitarian reasons, partaking in 
medical treatments, or participating in sanctioned religious organizations (República de Chile 
2019b). The conditions for the “Definitive Permanence Visas” require resources or connections 
that Haitian immigrants are unlikely to possess. Such as, the immigrant must either have family 
ties with definitive nationals or residents in Chile, work for specific businesses, or contribute 
significantly to the “social, cultural, artistic, scientific, and sporting sphere” of Chile (República 
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de Chile 2019b). In summation, this data will reveal whether Venezuelans were granted 
permanent residency visas before establishing the new policies. 
Chile’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Migration (Departamento de Extranjería y 
Migración) provides migratory statistics on the number of “Temporary Visas Granted” and 
“Definitive Permanence Visas Granted” (República de Chile 2019b). The department 
differentiates between immigrant groups from varying countries across time, which is compiled 
through visa applications. This data provides unbiased statistics to determine whether 
Venezuelan or Haitian immigrants were more likely to receive a visa before and after changing 
the visa regulations. 
Graph 2 shows that between 2015-2016, Venezuelans and Haitians received nearly the 
same number of temporary visas. However, from 2017-2018, Venezuelans obtained 20,000-
25,000 more temporary visas than Haitians. In a similar manner, Graph 3 shows that between 
2015-2016 the number of permanent visas to Venezuelans and Haitians increased 
proportionately. Whereas, in 2018, the number of permanent visas granted to Venezuelans 
doubled by nearly 18,000 visas whereas, the number of Haitian immigrants only rose by 3,500. 
These numerical discrepancies in the permanent visas granted are consistent with the creation of 
the 2018 visa, which allowed Venezuelan immigrants the same accessibility to visas while 
creating stricter policies for Haitian immigrants to obtain the visa. Graph 3 also reveals that the 
Chilean government expressed preference towards Venezuelan immigrants prior to changing the 
laws while hindering the number of Haitians that received definitive visas. Thus, the data 
reiterates that while Chile proposed both immigration visas to appear less discriminatory towards 
Haitian immigrants, they did, in fact, specifically target Haitian immigrants.  
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Graph 2 (República de Chile 2019b) 
 
 
Graph 3 (República de Chile 2019b). 
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Venezuelan and Haitian Economic Dependence 
Another aspect that must be considered is the economic dependency of both Venezuelans 
and Haitians in Chile. In theory, if an immigrant posed an insurmountable economic burden on 
that nation, the economic approach would explain changes in immigration laws. However, if a 
prosperous nation containing two immigrant groups -one posing a significant financial burden, 
and one that does not- chooses to exclude the group with less economic dependence, the 
causation likely aligns with non-monetary reasons. This section seeks to answer the question: 
Which group of immigrants is more likely to be economically dependent on the Chilean 
government?   
 The INE 2017 Census measured the potential level of economic dependency immigrants 
have on the Chilean government. Comparing the population that is “theoretically” inactive in 
relation to the “theoretically” active population measures an immigrant’s economic dependence. 
Considering the percentage of immigrants that make up the total Chilean population, it is 
difficult to determine whether this dependency impacts the Chilean-born population or the 
economy itself. Graph 4 reveals that the total Venezuelan economic dependency was 15.8%, 
which was three times higher than the overall economic dependence of Haitian immigrants in 
2017 (INE 2017). Scrutinizing this information reveals that, in theory, Venezuelan immigrants 
relied more on the Chilean economy. Despite the statistical data, in practice, Haitian immigrants 
received the stricter visa requirements, which questions whether a perceived economic or 
“cultural identity” threat caused the new visas.  
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Graph 4 (INE 2017) 
 
Public Opinions on Immigration 
Exploring Chilean public opinion surveys uncovers the impact public sentiment had on 
reforming immigration laws. It is necessary to determine the current Chilean-born population’s 
reaction to the arrival of ethnically and culturally diverse immigrants. These public opinion 
surveys are divided into two types of questions. The first set of surveys concentrate on the 
perception, tolerance, and mindset towards immigration in general. These questions depict 
whether Chileans felt threatened by the thought of all immigrants, and if it correlated with the 
year the visas policies changed. The other set of surveys determine the same variables yet focus 
on Haitian immigrants. This data provides a more direct understanding of Chilean opinions 
towards Haitian immigrants; thus, providing further evidence to use inductive reasoning to 
determine why the new visa laws restrict Haitian from immigrating to Chile. While surveys on 
Chilean perspective of Venezuelan immigration would have been beneficial, none has been 
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conducted thus far. Overall, these public opinion surveys provide adequate analysis of overall 
Chilean attitudes towards immigration in Chile over the past five to ten years.  
 
View on General Immigration 
CADEM is a local Chilean company that has conducted surveys since 1975. The data 
ranges from face-to-face, to web, and telephone surveys. CADEM surveys weekly on various 
topics to provide current data on the Chilean public opinion (CADEM 2018a, b, c, and 2019). 
The four initial survey questions ask how Chileans perceive the current number of immigrants, if 
immigrants are good or bad for the country, whether the government should make more 
restrictions, and approval of how the government is handling immigration. Each CADEM sample 
asked 700-750 people through a telephone survey (CADEM 2018a, b, c, and 2019).  
The first two questions analyze whether Chilean opinion changed as a result of an 
increase in immigration. The first survey question asked, “Would you say that the current 
number of immigrants in Chile is…?” and respondents answered with High, Normal, or Low 
(Alto, Normal, Bajo) (CADEM 2018c). Analyzing data from 2016 and 2018 reveal whether the 
influx of immigrants affected Chilean opinions. The second survey question was “Do you think 
the arrival of immigrants to Chile is good or bad for the country?” and respondents answered 
with Good, Bad, or Neither Good nor Bad (Bueno, Malo, Ni Bueno ni Malo) (CADEM 2018b). 
In a similar manner, this graph analyzes data from 2016 and 2018 to show whether immigrant 
arrival sparked negative or positive public sentiment.  
Despite the immigrant population only making up 4.4% of the entire population (INE 
2017), Graph 5 shows that from 2016 to 2018 Chileans perceived high immigrant rates. This 
perception likely increased due to the rapid influx of immigrants. Although, the influx may not 
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be high numerically, it was perceived by Chileans to be dramatic. In Graph 6, Chileans reported 
that immigration was bad for the country from the end of 2016 until mid-2018. Nevertheless, 
2018 data showed a significant decline in anti-immigration views, which is likely due to Haitians 
leaving on humanitarian flights and the decrease in arrival of Haitian immigrants. Upon 
evaluating each graph, I inferred that the public’s opinion on immigration affected President 
Piñera’s decision to change the visas.  
 
 
Graph 5 (CADEM 2018c) 
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Graph 6 (CADEM 2018b) 
  
 Holding a similar bearing, I combined the survey data to analyze whether Chilean 
opinion on immigration tolerance and approval correlated. The third survey question asks, “Do 
you think Chile should maintain an open-door policy or place more restrictions on immigration?” 
and respondents answered with Open Doors or Restrictions (Puertas Abiertas, Restricciones) 
(CADEM 2018c and 2018 b). This graph examines data from 2016 and 2018 to show whether 
the influx of immigrants changed Chilean opinions to make immigration stricter or more lenient. 
The fourth survey question asks, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the government is 
managing immigration in 2018?”. Answers for this question varied between Approve and 
Disapprove (Aprueba, Desaprueba) (CADEM 2019). This graph consists of data from 2018 
when President Piñera established the new visas, which is a key component for determining 
Chilean support for stricter visas.  
 From 2016 to 2018, Graph 7 reveals that the few Chileans who did prefer an open-door 
policy decreased. Exponentially, more Chileans support increasing immigration restrictions. 
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Respectively, due to waves of immigration from 2016 to 2018, support continually increased. 
Graph 8 shows that more Chileans supported the government’s management of immigration in 
the year Piñera changed the visas. This information correlates with the study conducted on 
Chilean media that showed how negative sentiments increased with the influx of immigrants. 
Despite crime rates’ stagnation during the years in which immigrants arrived, Chilean sentiment 
of their arrival turned negative. Because CADEM did not present this question before 2018, it is 
not possible to look at previous years. Ultimately, analysis of the graphs supports the idea that 
Chilean public opinion drove the change in immigration laws.  
 
 
Graph 7 (CADEM 2018c and 2018 b) 
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Graph 8 (CADEM 2019) 
 
View of Haitian Immigrants 
Understanding the Chilean opinion on immigration is valuable to determine how willing 
they will permit visas. However, survey questions specifically concerning Haitian immigration 
provide a more nuanced interpretation of Chilean disdain towards the group. These surveys 
originate from The Center for Conflict and Social Cohesion Studies (El Centro de Estudios de 
Conflicto y Cohesión Social), which conducts a Longitudinal Study of Chile (Estudio 
Longitudinal Social de Chile), which is a panel-type study that surveys nearly 3,000 Chilean 
annually (COES 2018). I focus on the 2018 version of this study because it features questions on 
the perceived threat from Haitian immigrants in Chilean society. This COES survey presented a 
structured questionnaire that represents approximately 77% of the Chilean population (COES 
2018). I utilize the survey to provide data on Chilean approval of the “Orderly Return Plan” 
(Plan de Regreso Ordenado) which encourages Haitian emigration to Haiti (CADEM 2018a). 
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The COES surveys asked for the “Effects of positive contact with immigrants on the 
perception of a realistic threat/symbolic threat” (Efecto del contacto positivo con inmigrantes 
sobre percepción de amenaza realista/amenaza simbólica) (COES 2018). Each survey question 
displayed how groups with “Low Positive Contact, Medium Positive Contact, and High Positive 
Contact” (Bajo Contacto Positivo, Medio Contacto Positivo, Alto Contacto Positivo) felt either a 
realistic or symbolic threat. The “Realistic Threat” discussed that with the arrival of Haitians in 
Chile, unemployment rates were threatened. On the other hand, the “Symbolic Threat” states that 
Chileans believe they lose their identity as Haitians arrive (COES 2018). Both surveys present a 
comparative study on Chile’s threat perception according to their levels of interaction with 
Haitian immigrants. Graph 9 reveals a negative correlation between positive contact and both the 
Realistic and Symbolic Threat. Therefore, as the rate of positive contact decreases, Chileans 
perceive more of each threat. This shows that each perceived threat increased with the thought of 
Haitian immigrants, rather than actual contact with them.  
 
 
Graph 9 (COES 2018) 
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The survey from CADEM focuses on Chilean opinion of the “Orderly Return Plan”, 
which is for Haitians to return to Haiti (CADEM 2018a). In general, CADEM concentrates on 
immigration questions rather than ones that are country specific. However, because immigration 
influxes greatly affected public concern on the topic, CADEM conducted the question: “Do you 
agree or disagree with the government-organized Orderly Return Plan of Haitians?” (¿Usted está 
de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con el Plan de Regreso Ordenado de haitianos organizado por el 
gobierno?). Respondents answered with “Agree” or “Disagree” (En Acuerdo, Desacuerdo) 
(CADEM 2018a). In Graph 10, 88% of Chileans show approval towards the government’s 
decision to provide free flights to return Haitian immigrants. However, regardless of this 
overwhelming quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis of the “Orderly Return Plan” shows 
Chileans’ momentous support in the removal of Haitian immigrants, despite the economic 
resources required to purchase those flights.  
 
 
Graph 10 (CADEM 2018a) 
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Public Perception of the Economy 
 Statistics of the demographics of each immigrant population, granted visas, public 
opinion surveys on immigration, etc., can only provide so much analysis as to whether changing 
immigration laws aligns with an economic or cultural identity threat. Due to the ambiguity of the 
“cultural identity”, it is imperative to determine if there was a correlation between the perception 
of the economy prior to changing the laws. Isolating Chilean perception of their economic status 
prior to the visa amendment and disassociating immigration, further solidifies this thesis. During 
this section, I reiterate that there is no correlation between household income and presidential 
support (LAPOP 2019) because statistically, Chilean’s socioeconomic status does not reflect 
their support for President Piñera. Also, it provides further analysis of Chile’s perceived need to 
protect their economic status during inundation of immigration.   
Data from the Center of Public Studies (Centro de Estudios Públicos) shows if Chileans 
determined their personal economic growth as progressing or regressing economically in recent 
years (CEP 2019). CEP is a private non-profit academic foundation that conducts a National 
Study of Public Opinion (Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública) to exhibit Chilean’s perceptions 
on various topics such as the politics, economy, and societal problems. In 2019. approximately 
1,400 were surveyed through face-to-face interview (CEP 2019). Analysis of this data indicates 
whether Chileans faced personal economic instability during the years when immigration laws 
became stricter. 
The survey question asked, “How would you rate your current economic situation?” 
(¿Cómo calificaría usted su actual situación económica?). Respondents answered with 
“Bad/Very Bad”, “Neither Good nor Bad”, or “Good/Very Good” (Mala/Muy Mala, Ni Buena ni 
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Mala, Buena/Muy Buena). Graph 11 shows that from 2007 until 2019, Chileans thought of their 
economic situation as relatively stable, meaning that Chileans believed their current economic 
situation was neither good nor bad. Seeing that the Chileans perceived neither a positive nor a 
negative effect on their economic status, this makes the opinions less polarizing. This data 
coincides with the theory that visas did not change due to a perceived economic threat. For this 
reason, Chileans reporting a lack of economic hardship upon the arrival of Haitian immigrants 
contradicts the economic approach, which claims that Haitian immigrants are an economic 
threat.  
   
 
Graph 11 (CEP 2019) 
 
The other survey question derives from Latinobarómetro (Latin Barometer), which 
provides data on public opinions in Latin American countries (Latinobarómetro 2018b). Its 
studies consist of around 20,000 interviews in 18 countries across Latin America to investigate 
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the development of democracy, the economy, and society (Latinobarómetro 2018b). I 
implemented this information to compare the relative economic prosperity of Chile since 2010 
and its effects on the perceived economic threat from immigrants. 
The survey asked the question, “Do you think the country’s current economic situation is 
better, the same, or worse than it was a year ago?” (¿Considera que la situación económica actual 
del país está mejor, igual, o peor que hace doce meses?). Respondents answered with “Better”, 
“Same”, or “Worse” (Mejor, Igual, Peor). I focus on the data that was available from 2010 to 
present day Chile. This enables me to analyze the potential effects of the perception of the state’s 
economy on changing the immigration laws. Like Graph 11, Graph 12 reveals that from 2010 to 
2018, most respondents believed the overall economy remained the same. Therefore, this graph 
also contradicts the economic approach because it shows that Chileans did not find their 
economic status to be deteriorating during the influx of immigrants.  
 
 
Graph 12 (Latinobarómetro 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018a) 
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 At first glance, it is important to include survey data targeting how immigrants might 
affect Chilean citizen’s opinions of their personal economic stability, none have been conducted 
thus far. Despite this, I find that the surveys presented in this section sufficiently prove that 
Chileans experienced no effect on their economic status during the years Chile received influxes 
of immigrants. Therefore, there is a significant lack of consistency for the economic approach, 
which supports President Piñera changing the immigration policies as a result of the current 
population fearing economic instability.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 Based on my research, I conclude that dedicating specific immigration visas to 
Venezuelan and Haitian immigrants in 2018 is more consistent with the “cultural identity” threat, 
rather than the economic threat. I recommend that additional conclusive data, such as analyzing 
the future effects of the visas on the Haitian immigrant population and Chilean society, would 
further solidify my findings.  
 Compiling data on the total population of Haitian immigrants in comparison to the native 
Chilean population showed that Haitians make up less than 1% of the total population as the 6th 
largest immigrant group in Chile. Subsequently, Venezuelan immigrants pose three times more 
economic reliance on Chile’s economy. Therefore, Haitian immigrants did not pose more of a 
threat to Chile’s financial security. Ranking 71st globally, Chile’s immigrant population is 
insignificant in comparison to other countries. As a result, President Piñera restricting one of its 
smaller immigrant groups is unlikely to have an impact on its total immigrant population.  
 Public surveys illustrated that from 2016 to 2018, Chilean believed that immigration rates 
were high and confidently supported the government’s management of immigration. Towards the 
end of 2018, support for immigration reform continued to rise. This coincides with the 
implementation of humanitarian flights deporting Haitians home and the decline of the Haitian 
immigrant population due to the newly restricted visas. As a result, in 2018, with the new visas, 
Chileans began to receive the immigrants they “preferred”. These desired immigrants reflected 
Chilean’s cultural identity, whereas Haitians did not. Decidedly, the number of temporary visas 
granted pales in comparison to the definitive permanency visas permitted. This corresponds with 
the Chilean population’s apparent contempt for Haitian immigrants before the visas changed in 
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2018. Moreover, a majority of the Chilean population agreed with the humanitarian flights 
sending Haitian nationals to their country of origin. Above all, the data links Chile’s perception 
of immigration reform with the influx of Haitian immigrants and their departure and restricted 
travel to Chile. Chiefly, this shows that Chileans found Haitian immigrants the primary threat to 
their nation.  
 Further opinion surveys revealed that regardless of the threat perceived by the native 
Chilean population, it significantly increased with less positive contact with Haitian immigrants. 
Analysis of this data shows that the visual perception of Haitian immigrants, rather than direct 
contact, increases the threat Chileans perceive. I assess that this discernment is due to Haitians 
distinguishingly unique “cultural identity” and difficulty in conforming to the homogenous 
ethnicity and culture of Chile.   
 Finally, in the year immediately before reforming visas, the opinions on economic 
perception showed that most Chileans found both their economic situation and the actual 
economy of Chile, as neither significantly good nor bad. In brief, the lack of a sudden increase or 
decrease in Chilean’s perceived financial security contradicts the theory that Haitian immigrants 
posed an economic threat. In the case that Chileans had felt their economic security threatened, it 
is likely that due to the small number of Haitians in Chile, it would not have had an impact. This 
analysis aligns with the theory that Chileans did not believe the influx of immigration affected 
their financial security, proving the creation of stricter visas was likely due to a “cultural 
identity” threat.  
Ultimately, it is easier to refute that the economic approach resulted in the change in 
immigration laws rather than finding a correlation with the “cultural identity” theory. It is 
challenging to definitively prove that the “cultural identity” theory is the sole causation of 
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changing immigration laws due to the subjective, and possibly offensive nature of the necessary 
research. However, this case study provides an umbrella of evidence encompassing the perceived 
“cultural identity” threat that caused Chile to restrict Haitian immigrants.      
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Chapter 6: Appendices 
Appendix 1: Venezuelan and Haitian Visas 
Appendix 2: Types of Residencies Granted to Immigrants 
Appendix 3: Pictures of Discrimination Against Haitian Immigrants   
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Appendix 1 
 
A  
 
Temporary Visa of Democratic Responsibility: Venezuela  
Purpose: 
This visa may only be requested in the consulates of Chile in Venezuela. Confers 
permission of temporary residence for an extended year. After the year, the visa 
holder can request definitive permanence and after two years, must ask for 
definitive stay.  
Requirements: 
-Background check effective for 3 months  
-Valid Passport 
-5 x 5 color picture with a white background 
-Birth certificate required for minors  
 
 
B 
 
Simple Tourist Consular Visa: Haiti 
Purpose: 
Effective beginning on April 16, 2018, Haitian citizens who wish to travel to Chile 
for tourism reasons must first obtain a consular tourist visa, which is processed at 
the Chilean consulate in any country where they are located.  
Requirements: 
-Valid passport for the period of stay  
-Background check effective for 3 months 
-Hotel reservation  
-Invitation letter 
-Accreditation of economic solvency  
-Copy of purchased (round trip) tickets 
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C 
 
Temporary Family Reunification Visa: Haiti 
Purpose: 
Family reunification of Haitian citizens, the Government of Chile allows a 1-year 
visa, which can be extended. After the year, the visa holder can ask for the definite 
permanence, and after two years, must request definitive stay. It can be requested by 
spouses, civil cohabitants, children under the age of 24 who study until age 24, and 
do not have a criminal record. It can be requested only at the visa center of the 
International Organization of Migration in Haiti, upon request for an appointment. 
Requirements: 
-Valid Passport 
-Background check valid for 3 months  
-Accreditation of a duly legalized family member, with Haitian citizen residing in 
Chile (spouse, civil cohabitant, a minor who studied until 24 years of age) 
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Appendix 2 
 
A 
 
Temporary Residence 
Intention: 
Permit residence granted to foreigners who intend on settling in Chile for a 
limited time who can apply from abroad 
Duration: Unspecified 
Requirements: 
-Foreigners who can prove family ties with Chileans of definitive residents 
-Foreigners who enter the country to carry out lawful paid activities 
-Foreigners established in the country with the aim of studying in state-
recognized educational establishments 
-Seasonal workers, who enter the country for limited periods, to perform 
specific seasonal work 
-Those who are subject to the custody of Gendarmerie of Chile or with a 
current judicial process 
-For humanitarian reasons 
-Foreigners covered by international agreements ratified by Chile  
-Officially recognized religious organizations 
-For medical treatment  
-Retirees or renters 
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B 
 
Definitive Residence 
Intention: A residence permit to settle indefinitely in Chile 
Duration: 
Temporary residents who have resided in the country in such quality may 
apply for at least 24 months and may be extended to 48 months if they do not 
meet some minimum requirements. The application may be made at 12 
months of temporary residence in the following cases. 
Requirements: 
-Family ties with definitive nationals or residents 
-Official missions carried out in Chile 
-Available for rent or pensions 
-Executed investments and/or companies attesting to effective operation in 
Chile 
-Contribute to the social, cultural, artistic, scientific and sporting sphere  
 
  
Geist 51 
 
Appendix 3  
A: Picture of a humanitarian flight returning immigrants to Haiti 
 
 
B: Picture of a Haitian caricature in Santiago, Chile 
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C: Picture of a protest that occurred following the death of Joane Florvil 
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